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Abstract
We investigated whether chimpanzees use the temporal sequence of external events to determine causation. Seventeen chim-
panzees (Pan troglodytes) witnessed a human experimenter press a button in two different conditions. When she pressed 
the “causal button” the delivery of juice and a sound immediately followed (cause-then-effect). In contrast, she pressed the 
“non-causal button” only after the delivery of juice and sound (effect-then-cause). When given the opportunity to produce 
the desired juice delivery themselves, the chimpanzees preferentially pressed the causal button, i.e., the one that preceded 
the effect. Importantly, they did so in their first test trial and even though both buttons were equally associated with juice 
delivery. This outcome suggests that chimpanzees, like human children, do not rely solely on their own actions to make use 
of novel causal relations, but they can learn causal sequences based on observation alone. We discuss these findings in rela-
tion to the literature on causal inferences as well as associative learning.
Keywords Causal cognition · Social learning · Chimpanzees · Action representation · Simultaneous conditioning · Primate 
cognition
Introduction
Learning causal sequences enables organisms to flexibly 
adapt to their environment and, potentially, to control it 
(Waldmann and Hagmayer 2005). Experiencing the effects 
of their own actions is one of the main ways that organisms 
have at their disposal for learning causal sequences (Leis-
ing et al. 2008). Despite its theoretical and practical impor-
tance, to what extent nonhuman animals are also capable of 
learning causal sequences by mere observation (and after 
minimal exposure) is largely unknown (e.g., Blaisdell et al. 
2006; Bonawitz et al. 2010; Taylor et al. 2014; Tomasello 
and Call 1997; Premack 2007; Völter et al. 2016). Learning 
causal structures based on correlational evidence is difficult 
because multiple causal structures can lead to the same pat-
tern of correlations (the “causal inverse problem”; Gopnik 
et al. 2004). Observing interventions of other agents can be 
an effective way to learn causal sequences by observation 
alone (Gopnik and Schulz 2010; Woodward 2012). Par-
ticularly, events that reliably follow actions can usually be 
interpreted as the effect of this action (Meltzoff et al. 2012). 
Temporal directionality is one of the defining features of 
causal relations as opposed to correlations (Goldvarg and 
Johnson-Laird 2001). Keeping track of the temporal order of 
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events when watching the actions of other agents can there-
fore help to reduce the causal ambiguity.
In nonhuman primates, research on social learning has 
mostly been concerned with the question to what extent, 
particularly nonhuman great apes (henceforth: apes), resem-
ble human children with respect to their imitative (espe-
cially: action copying) abilities (e.g., Nagell et al. 1993). 
Whereas apes have sometimes been found to spontaneously 
copy familiar actions (Fuhrmann et al. 2014; Tennie et al. 
2012) they do not appear to copy novel actions (Clay and 
Tennie 2018; Tennie et al. 2012). It has been suggested that 
unenculturated, untrained apes instead rely more (or even 
exclusively) on other social learning mechanisms such as 
emulation and local enhancement (e.g., Nagell et al. 1993; 
Tennie et al. 2010). In two-location tasks, in which partici-
pants are presented with demonstrations involving manipu-
lations of two different locations on/in a puzzle box, apes 
(unlike human children) have been found to be selective in 
their own approach following observational learning oppor-
tunities: namely when the apes could see that one of the 
target locations was visibly not physically connected with 
the location of the reward, they subsequently ignored that 
location in their approach (Horner and Whiten 2005; Nielsen 
and Susianto 2010). In the latter situation, apes tended to 
manipulate predominantly the target location that was vis-
ibly physically connected to the location of the food reward. 
This raises the question of how apes differentiate between 
causally relevant and irrelevant location demonstrations in 
such situations. Apart from physical connectedness, spatio-
temporal contiguity and temporal directionality can provide 
relevant cues. In the two-location task, manipulation of the 
causally relevant location of the puzzle box directly pre-
ceded the outcome (i.e., the appearance of the reward). It is 
thus possible that apes made use of the temporal structure of 
events, which has been termed observational causal learning 
in the developmental literature (Meltzoff et al. 2012).
In the current study, we therefore attempted to replicate 
a key finding from the developmental literature on observa-
tional causal learning (Meltzoff et al. 2012, Experiment 3) 
in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Chimpanzees witnessed 
a human experimenter press two buttons; pressing one 
button was immediately followed by the delivery of juice 
and a sound (cause-then-effect) while pressing the other 
one was preceded by delivery of juice and a sound (effect-
then-cause). If chimpanzees, like 24-month-old human 
children, can learn directed causal relations from temporal 
cues alone, we hypothesized, they would prefer the button 
whose activation preceded the effect (i.e., the cause-then-
effect demonstration).
Materials and methods
Subjects
We tested 22 chimpanzees housed in two groups at Wolf-
gang Köhler Primate Research Center, Leipzig Zoo, 
Germany. Subjects voluntarily participated in the study 
and were neither food- nor water-deprived. We excluded 
five subjects for not reaching the training criterion, as 
described below.
Apparatus and stimuli
We tested subjects individually in two testing rooms 
(group A: 25 m2; group B: 19 m2). Four subjects could not 
be separated from their respective groups. Consequently, 
they were tested with conspecifics staying in an adjacent 
room. However, we occluded the conspecifics’ view on the 
apparatus and the subject to prevent any observations of 
the study procedure.
We videotaped each session. The camera was positioned 
behind the first experimenter (E1), focusing on the sub-
ject as well as on the parts of the apparatus visible to the 
subject (i.e., the two push-down buttons). The apparatus 
was attached outside the subject’s testing room and con-
sisted of a sliding table (3 × 80 × 38 cm) with two but-
tons (mounted on the right and the left side of the sliding 
platform), a juice dispenser (45 × 17 × 17 cm) below, and 
three occluders (see Fig. 1). The juice dispenser was an 
electric liquid garden pump that was altered to pump juice 
with a constant pressure into the subject’s enclosure once 
E1 pressed a hidden foot pedal. The delivery of juice was 
electronically linked to a sound emitter with a tonal sound 
(approximate frequency of 1 Hz and loudness of 70 dB at 
1 m distance) that was audible as long as the hidden foot 
pedal was pressed (compare Meltzoff et al. 2012). We fixed 
the sliding table, at a height of 50 cm, to a metal mesh grid 
(55 × 72 × 2 cm) of the subject’s enclosure.
Four visually distinct pairs of identical buttons served as 
stimuli. For the training phase, we used a sliding platform 
with only one centrally placed button on it. This training 
button was differently shaped and sized than those used for 
the subsequent observation and test phase. All buttons were 
fixed on square pieces of plastic that fit flush into square 
plastic frames (10 × 10 cm) on the sliding platform. We 
adjusted each button to the same height and distance to the 
edge of the plastic frame (ensuring that both buttons were 
located at equal distance from the subject). We painted 
each button with a thin blue or white ring at its bottom that 
became invisible when the bottom top was pressed down. 
This was to facilitate the visual coding of button-pressing.
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As a matter of fact, pressing the buttons did not actually 
lead to any effect—all buttons were sham-buttons—and so 
E1 produced all effects with the help of pressing the hid-
den foot pedal. At the beginning of each trial, E1 placed 
two buttons (one at the upper left and one at the right cor-
ner of the sliding platform). E1 exchanged these buttons 
after each trial for different ones (original placement as 
well as button exchanges happened behind two occluders). 
Below the sliding table another occluder (50 × 70 × 35 cm) 
constantly hid the foot pedal of the juice dispenser as well 
as E1’s leg movements that activated the pedal. In the mid-
dle of the mesh grid, we fixed a Plexiglas tube (inner diam-
eter 3 cm), which went into the subject’s cage to facilitate 
the drinking for the subject and to make sure that the sub-
ject was orientated towards the demonstrations as well as 
having full view of them. This tube also was connected to 
and supported (and protected) the hose that went through 
a hole in the middle of the sliding table to connect to the 
juice dispenser setup. E1 adjusted a hose coupling prior to 
trials so that the amount of delivered juice stayed constant 
over all trials (i.e., 50 ml per single delivery).
Procedure
There were three phases: a training phase, an observa-
tion phase, and a test phase. Following the training phase, 
we tested subjects in two sessions, with two trials each. 
The buttons that appeared causal (see below) stayed on 
the same side within sessions, but were switched across 
sessions. In every test trial, we presented subjects with a 
novel pair of buttons.
Training phase
Each subject completed three training sessions to ensure 
that general button-pressing behavior would occur in the 
test phase. We trained subjects to press a single (central) 
training button with enough force so that it made an audi-
ble click sound. We rewarded them by four continuous 
seconds of juice (accompanied by the sound) through the 
juice delivery setup every time they pressed the button. 
Subjects passed training phase A as soon as they reliably 
pressed the training button ten times in a row in a session 
that lasted for a maximum of 20 min). This procedure was 
repeated three times at most. Subjects reached the training 
criterion if they further managed to press the training but-
ton ten times in a row within 60 s during two subsequent 
sessions (training phase B). Once a subject passed train-
ing phases A and B, we presented it with the observation 
and test phase. Seventeen subjects passed and five subjects 
failed to reach this criterion. We excluded the latter indi-
viduals from further testing. Before each of the two test 
sessions (i.e., before trial 1 and 3), we performed refresher 
trials, in which subjects had to press the centralized single 
training button two times within 60 s. All subjects passed 
these refresher trials.
Observation phase
The observation phase largely followed the procedure 
administered by Meltzoff et al. (2012, Experiment 3). The 
causal sequence (“causal button”; henceforth “C”) started 
with a prolonged manual button press whose initiation coin-
cided with juice delivery and sound. E1 released the but-
ton after 2 s, while the sound emitter and juice dispenser 
were activated for another 2 s (i.e., 4 s in total). For the 
other “non-causal button” (henceforth “N”), we reversed the 
sequence, i.e., the activation of the juice dispenser and sound 
emitter preceded the button press (but juice/sound lasted 
again 4 s). During N demonstrations E1 pressed the button 
coinciding with the start of the third second of juice flow 
and sound for a duration of 2 s. At the beginning of each 
trial, subjects received ten demonstrations in total (five per 
Fig. 1  Illustration of the experimental setup. The experimenter’s but-
ton press is indicated by the downwards arrow (here the left button). 
For the causal sequence, the onset of the juice flow coincided with 
the button press—thus appearing to cause the juice flow—while for 
the non-causal sequence the button press was delayed: here the juice 
already flowed before the button was pressed. In both cases, the 
experimenter pressed the button for the same amount of time—thus 
the juice flow was equally associated with button pressing irrespec-
tive of the condition
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C button and five per N button), during which we kept both 
buttons out of the subject’s reach.
The demonstration order was taken from Meltzoff et al. 
(2012) and followed either a CNNCNNCNCC (henceforth 
“Version 1”) or a NCCNCCNCNN (henceforth “Version 
2”) design—counterbalanced across subjects. Half of the 
subjects started with Version 1 and the other half started 
with Version 2. Within these two groups, half of the subjects 
started with a demonstration of the left button first and half 
of them started with the right button first. We matched the 
resulting four groups as much as possible for age, rank, and 
sex. The button types for each trial were identical across the 
subjects.
E1 always pressed the buttons with the index finger and 
timed button pressing with the pressing of the foot pedal 
(either at the same time as juice/sound, in C demonstrations; 
or with a 2-s delay after juice/sound onset, in N demonstra-
tions) with the help of a metronome. The metronome was 
audible only for E1 via headphones (one beep per second), 
which allowed E1 to time the 2- and 4-s intervals. To ensure 
a reliable timing, E1 passed a practice phase before the start 
of data collection and fulfilled a 90% correctness criterion 
after 25 practice trials (a deviance of more than half a second 
was counted as incorrect).
Mistakes made by E1 in the observation phase led to an 
immediate repetition of the affected demonstration (i.e., 
the single affected button demonstration). Overall, these 
mistakes happened six times: one mistake was made in 
demonstration order (in a first trial of the first session); 
five mistakes concerned experimental setup problems (i.e., 
short-term malfunctioning of the juice delivery system; this 
happened four times in the first trial of the first session and 
once in the first trial of the second session). During dem-
onstrations, another experimenter (E2) live-coded whether 
the subject was attentive during each demonstration (eyes 
open and gazing towards demonstrations). If E2 deemed the 
subject to have been inattentive, only the single affected but-
ton demonstration was repeated. This happened five times 
in total (once in trial 1 and once in trial 2 of the first ses-
sion and once in trial 1 and twice in trial 2 of the second 
session). Once the subject had attended to the required five 
demonstrations per button (causal and non-causal)—ten in 
total—the test phase commenced.
Test phase
The test phase immediately followed the observation phase. 
For the test phase, E1 moved the sliding platform with the 
two buttons (the same ones used during the observation 
phase) towards the mesh grid, enabling the subject to press 
one of the buttons. A button press was coded once the sub-
ject pressed with enough force so that the trigger markings 
became invisible and the ‘click’ sound was audible. Subjects 
were rewarded non-differentially: any button press immedi-
ately released juice (and produced the sound) for four con-
tinuous seconds (controlled always by E1 pressing the foot 
pedal coinciding with the button press as defined above). If 
the subject failed to press any of the buttons within 60 s, the 
demonstration phase was repeated on a different day and 
this test trial was then also repeated [this happened three 
times in total (all in session 1: twice in the first trial and once 
in the second trial)]. After the subject had pressed a but-
ton, the sliding table was pulled back to prevent the subject 
from ‘double’-choice (i.e., from pressing the other button). 
Double-choices could not be fully prevented in this way, 
but they only happened five times across all subjects and 
sessions (twice in session 1, both in the first trials of the ses-
sion), and three times in session 2 (two of which happened 
in the first trials of the session, and one in the second trial). 
Double-choices were not rewarded.
Scoring
The data of 17 subjects (who passed the training phase) 
were analyzed. All statistical tests were two-tailed. E1 coded 
from the video, which button was pressed (button choice), 
defined as producing a click sound and making the painted 
line below the button top invisible.
The mean performance in the 11 trials that included a 
repeated demonstration (due to experimenter mistakes or 
subjects’ inattentiveness) during the observation phase (64% 
correct) was similar to the performance in the remaining 
trials (58% correct). Crucially, subjects’ above-chance per-
formance in the first session was not driven by these trials 
(trials with a repeated demonstration: 67% correct; remain-
ing trials: 82% correct).
A second coder blind to the purpose of this study coded 
button choice for 50% of the trials, randomly chosen. Inter-
rater agreement was excellent (Cohen’s kappa = 0.88, 
N = 34).
Analysis
We fitted a generalized linear mixed model (GLMM; Baayen 
2008) with binomial error structure and logit link function 
(McCullagh and Nelder 1989) to analyze the influence of the 
predictor variables session, trial number (within session), 
and the side of the causal button on chimpanzees’ choice 
performance (causal button presses coded as “1”, non-causal 
button presses coded as “0”). We included subject ID as ran-
dom effect and all possible random slope components (Barr 
et al. 2013). Following a significant effect of session, we 
analyzed the two sessions separately. Specifically, we used 
the intercept of these models to evaluate whether the per-
formance in each session deviated significantly from chance 
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level of 0.5 while accounting for trial number and the side 
of the causal button.
As an overall test of the effect of the predictor variables, 
we compared the full model with a null model lacking 
the test predictors but comprising the same random effect 
structure as the full model (Forstmeier and Schielzeth 2011) 
using a likelihood ratio test (Dobson 2002). P values for the 
individual effects were based on likelihood ratio tests com-
paring the full with respective reduced models (Barr et al. 
2013) using R function drop1 with argument ‘test’ set to 
“Chisq”. The model was implemented in R (version 3.5.2; R 
Development Core Team 2018) using the function glmer of 
the R package lme4 (Bates et al. 2016). Confidence intervals 
were derived using the function bootMer of the R package 
lme4, using 1000 parametric bootstraps and bootstrapping 
over the random effects.
Prior to fitting the models, all predictor variables were 
z-transformed (to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 
one). We determined variance inflation factors (Field 2005) 
for standard linear models excluding the random effects 
using the R package car (Fox and Weisberg 2011). Colline-
arity was no issue (maximum variance inflation factor: 1.00).
Results
The full model fitted the data significantly better com-
pared to a null model that lacked the predictor variables 
but included the same random effects structure (χ2 = 8.58, 
df = 3, p = 0.035). Chimpanzees performed significantly bet-
ter in the first session compared to the second session (for 
the model results, see Table 1). There were no significant 
effects of trial number (within session) or the side of the 
causal button.
Following the significant effect of session, we analyzed 
the two sessions separately. We found that chimpanzees 
performed significantly better than expected by chance in 
session 1 (intercept: estimate ± SE: 6.71 ± 2.42, z = 2.78, 
p = 0.006, 95% CI [2.39, 12.64]) but not in session 2 (inter-
cept: − 0.53 ± 0.42, z = − 1.26, p = 0.207, 95% CI [− 12.59, 
0.67]).
We found a similar pattern when we analyzed the data 
on a trial-by-trial basis (see Fig. 2). In both trials of the 
first testing session, the chimpanzees chose the causal but-
ton, as predicted, significantly more often than the non-
causal one (trial 1: 13 of 17 chimpanzees chose the causal 
button; exact binomial test, p = 0.049; trial 2: 14 of the 
17 chimpanzees chose the causal button; exact binomial 
test, p = 0.013). During the second session and contrary to 
our predictions, subjects’ preference for the causal button 
disappeared (trial 3: six out of 17 chimpanzees choose 
the causal button, exact binomial test: p = 0.33; trial 4: 
seven of 17 chimpanzees choose the causal button, exact 
binomial test: p = 0.63).
Twelve of the 17 chimpanzees chose the same side 
twice in session 1. Ten of these 12 chimpanzees chose the 
same side again in their first trial in session 2 (exact bino-
mial test: p = 0.039; see Fig. 2), suggesting that the major-
ity of the chimpanzees acquired a side bias in session 1.
Table 1  Results of the GLMM 
with causal button choices as 
response variable
The predictor variables were z-transformed to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one
Estimate SE χ2 p 95% CI
Intercept 0.659 0.393 − 1.061 11.36
Session − 1.544 0.661 7.457 0.006 − 21.145 − 0.687
Trial number 0.206 0.458 0.243 0.622 − 3.519 5.674
Side of causal button 0.180 0.608 0.085 0.770 − 4.362 9.393
Fig. 2  Causal button choices as a function of trial number. Each cir-
cle corresponds to one individual. The width of the lines that con-
nect the circles is proportional to the number of represented individu-
als. Individuals who consistently chose the causal button in session 1 
(trials 1 and 2) tended to choose the same side in session 2 (trials 3 
and 4, resulting in non-causal button choices due to the administered 
counterbalancing scheme)
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Discussion
After the demonstrations, when given the opportunity to 
activate the juice dispenser themselves, chimpanzees in 
session 1 preferentially pressed the causal button, i.e., 
the one that preceded the effect. Importantly, they did so 
immediately in their first trial even though both buttons 
were equally associated with juice delivery, i.e., both but-
ton presses completely overlapped (by 2 s) with the juice 
flow. These results suggest that chimpanzees use tempo-
ral information to distinguish observed interventions that 
predict an outcome from actions that follow an outcome. 
This finding confirms that chimpanzees are sensitive to the 
temporal order of causal sequences (Hanus and Call 2008; 
Völter and Call 2014).
However, while the temporal order of events initially 
influenced chimpanzees’ choices, our findings also suggest 
that this learning bias might not prevail over the reinforced 
location. Chimpanzees who consistently chose one side 
in session 1 preferred to pick the same side in the first 
trial of session 2, even though the causal and non-causal 
button positions were now reversed. The decrease in per-
formance between session 1 and 2 might therefore be an 
artefact of the applied counterbalancing scheme. This out-
come suggests that when presented with a novel situation, 
chimpanzees pay attention to the temporal order of events. 
However, when they encounter the same situation again, 
they might remember the side of their previous response 
that led to the reward without paying attention to the tem-
poral information provided in the current demonstration. 
The non-differential reinforcement might have contributed 
to the acquisition of this side bias.
Our interpretation of the results is in line with two stud-
ies that investigated causal learning in great apes. In these 
studies, the chimpanzees performed particularly well (and 
significantly above chance) in the first trial of the experi-
mental condition (Völter and Call 2014; Völter et al. 2016). 
In contrast to the present study, however, in those studies 
the side of the correct option was not blocked within each 
session, which might explain why they did not acquire a 
side bias in those studies. Additionally, a number of stud-
ies on problem-solving abilities suggest that chimpanzees 
tend to stick to the first acquired problem-solving strategy 
(Gruber 2016; Hrubesch et al. 2009; Marshall-Pescini and 
Whiten 2008), as long as it leads to the acquisition of the 
food reward (Manrique et al. 2013). Together, these studies 
support the idea that chimpanzees pay attention to the tem-
poral order of events when they encounter novel situations, 
which, in turn, biases their choice performance. At the same 
time, the resulting positive reinforcement can lead to the 
acquisition of a side bias rather than increased attention to 
the temporal structure of events.
One might argue that we trained chimpanzees in the train-
ing phase to choose a causal button because they experi-
enced that pressing a button (presented centrally in the train-
ing phase) preceded delivery of juice. This account is not at 
odds with our interpretation of the data: after limited experi-
ence with a novel means–ends relationship in this training 
phase, chimpanzees made differential use of the temporal 
sequence in an observational learning context with two novel 
stimuli (i.e., novel buttons) and they distinguished button 
presses contingent with the onset of the reward from button 
presses that occurred after the onset of the reward.
The temporal sequence of events also seems to play 
an important role in associative learning. If a conditioned 
stimulus (CS), such as a light, is forward paired with an 
unconditioned stimulus (US), such as a footshock, animals 
tend to show stronger conditioned responses than when 
the US precedes the CS or when CS and US are presented 
simultaneously. Traditionally, this has been interpreted as 
evidence that learning is faster in forward conditioning than 
in backward or simultaneous conditioning (Pavlov 1927). 
However, more recent evidence suggests that associations 
are formed irrespective of the timing of the CS presentation 
(e.g., Barnet et al. 1991; Matzel et al. 1988). Instead, the dif-
ference between forward conditioning and backward/simul-
taneous conditioning seems to be whether animals anticipate 
the US based on the CS presentation, which appears to be 
the case particularly in forward conditioning. Savastano 
and Miller (1998) therefore concluded that animals encode 
the temporal relationship between events which affects the 
expression of the anticipatory response. The integration of 
temporal information in rats seems not to be restricted to 
fear conditioning but has also been reported in a appetitive 
conditioning context (Leising et al. 2007). The results of 
the present study supports these conclusions and extend it 
to nonhuman primates. Nevertheless, our findings differ in 
multiple ways from the previous work with rats: first, apes 
made a choice in the test phase between two CS, which had 
been previously paired in different temporal arrangements 
with the US. In contrast, in rats the strength of the condi-
tioned response was compared between subjects (follow-
ing different types of CS—US pairings; Barnet et al. 1991; 
Matzel et al. 1988). Second, we found differences between 
the simultaneous presentation of the CS and US and the 
US ⟶ CS backward pairing. In contrast, no marked differ-
ence between backward and simultaneous conditioning has 
been reported in rats (see Matzel et al. 1988).
One might argue that the difference between conditions 
was due to chimpanzees being distracted by the (juice) 
reward during the non-causal demonstration. In particular, 
during the non-causal button demonstration, chimpanzees 
were drinking juice when the experimenter pressed the non-
causal button, which was not the case for the causal button. 
This in turn might have led to a weaker association between 
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the non-causal button and the juice delivery compared with 
the causal button. However, our experimental design ensured 
that there was no obvious difference in overt attention 
between the two conditions. A second experimenter coded 
whether chimpanzees were attentive in both conditions and 
trials were repeated when chimpanzees were not watching 
the demonstration.
In sum, our results suggest that chimpanzees, like human 
children (see Meltzoff et al. 2012), can efficiently learn 
novel causal relations based on the temporal directionality 
of external events. Future studies are needed to determine 
the stability and flexibility of chimpanzees’ causal learning 
and which factors might enhance it, or inhibit it. With regard 
to stability, our study tentatively suggests that chimpanzees’ 
competence in this regard might be rather fragile and/or 
easily overridden. With regard to flexibility, one intriguing 
question for future research is to what extent chimpanzees 
can also use observation to infer more complex causal struc-
tures, including the use of observation to disambiguate more 
complex causal structures, similar to the work that has been 
done with children (Gopnik et al. 2001; Sobel et al. 2004; 
Völter et al. 2016).
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